IPS WP 08/11 The Changing Climate of New Zealand's Security: Risk and Resilience in a Climate Affected Security Environment
Sustaining stability and order in an environment of constant and chaotic change will be a defining security dilemma of the 21st century. We live in an era of ‘great acceleration’ across all aspects of life; social, economic, cultural, political and environmental. Global order and its constituent systems, sectors, regions and states are increasingly inundated by complexity and uncertainty. The corresponding security environment is neither static nor fixed. It is a dynamic landscape of diverse security challenges driven by adverse externalities of global social relations. Such unprecedented change and uncertainty challenge the capacity of strategically critical socio-political systems to absorb stress and manage severe disruptions.
Unfortunately, this dilemma will grow more acute and unmanageable in the next 50 years. For the corrosive impacts of climate change already loom on the horizon. Although scientific ambiguity remains, the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) scientific analyses conclude that warming of the Earth’s climate system is unequivocal and will continue, irrespective of greenhouse gas emission reductions, in the immediate decades. Climate change, in and of itself, is not a conventional threat to national or international security. Rather, it is a driver of malicious change. Global temperature increases will result in novel climatic scenarios that may generate a variety of physical impacts and social disturbances. These impacts or disturbances will, in turn, exacerbate many of the underlying forces already generating sociopolitical turbulence and precipitating unprecedented change. Ultimately, climate change will condition the security environment and catalyze further uncertainty, volatility and insecurity.
New Zealand is unavoidably embedded in this climate conditioned security environment. Prior to 2040 we will be forced to confront a spectrum of related security challenges. The intent of this paper is to raise awareness about the security implications of climate change, and orientate New Zealand’s decision makers and political leaders to a future security environment that is conditioned by largely unabated climate change. We have arrived at a junction that demands prudent political planning and preparation. Whilst global efforts at mitigation through a reduction in emissions remain a vital first step, New Zealand’s political leaders can no longer rely on mitigation efforts being successful. Dependence on a mitigation solution is perilous because the international community is dragging its feet in reaching an effective emissions reduction agreement. Sadly, it appears that international negotiations and institutions will continue to be inhibited by conflicting interests and trust deficits amongst the pivotal actors.
In the first and second section of this paper I seek to provide a means for decision makers to begin comprehending and managing the complex spectrum of security challenges that New Zealand could confront if climate change continues largely unmitigated (refer to box 3 p.19). The objective here is to come to terms with and understand the problem of integrating security assessments and a climate future of largely unabated climate change. This challenge is obviously vast, intricate and complex. An analyst or decision maker having to comprehend the strategic environment, integrate the potential impacts of climate change, plan for New Zealand’s future security challenges and prescribe a course of action embarks on a daunting task. It is easy to be overwhelmed by the infinite number of variables, future scenarios, and potential consequences.To learn how to manage security and initiate decision making whilst accommodating the characteristics of complexity, change, non-linearity, and uncertainty it is necessary to develop a security risk framework. Section one explains at length how the risk framework is comprised of: 1) the most likely physical impacts and social perturbations; 2) the vulnerability of strategic areas of interest (AOIs) to these impacts; and 3) the consequences for New Zealand should certain risk scenarios unfold. Subsequently, section two provides an essential overview of the broad strategic and climate change context. Section three identifies the continuous and dynamic interactions between the social perturbations and the physical impacts that could create the causal pathways triggering a range of periphery security challenges or, eventually, cases of large scale organized violence. The social perturbations of water scarcity, disruptions to food production and supply, extreme weather disasters and climate induced migration provide the critical interface between the climatic changes and security.4 In section four the risk framework is utilized to produce a preliminary assessment of selected risk scenarios. These scenarios are not predictions, but plausible descriptions about how the future may develop based on a set of relationships linking the contemporary security context, key physical impacts and the social perturbations. The utility of this preliminary assessment is to:
ensure decision makers avoid speculative scaremongering;
outline directions for further research and investigation into high riskscenarios; and
rehearse plausible scenarios to which leaders are better able to respond should they occur.
The final section has two objectives. First, it presents a case for what is seen as the most substantial risk facing New Zealand from largely unabated climate change. Second, it outlines an imperative for resilience and adaptive capacity that can be integrated into New Zealand’s security strategies. With regard to risk, I argue that a corrosive synergy of security challenges is the most troubling since any final outcome could prove greater than the sum of individual consequences. A climate affected security environment characterized by complexity, tight coupling and a high rate of change may leave political leaders juggling multiple security challenges simultaneously. At worst this could result in what some commentators term a ‘perfect storm’ where an adverse combination of challenges diffuses instability throughout New Zealand’s strategic areas of interest. This has significant consequences: The capacity to manage, adapt, and cope in such circumstances may be overwhelmed at national and global levels possibly transforming how states or actors pursue their political objectives.
Such unknowns and their potential for cascading consequences highlight the need to integrate resilience measures and adaptive capacities into New Zealand’s security strategies. Security challenges in the future climate affected environment will not be on grounds or terms of New Zealand’s choosing. Here New Zealand’s future security will depend upon its capacity and the capacity of strategic AOIs to: absorb disturbance; cope with change; act flexibly in response to the unanticipated; and ensure long-term recovery. In an era of uncertainty, developing national resilience and assisting its global development via improved adaptive capacity will prove a keystone for security.
ISBN:
Published in October 2008
