

THE NEED FOR JUSTICE: (6 May 2005 draft)

A.J.W. Taylor
Emeritus Professor of Psychology
Victoria University of Wellington NZ

Abstract

The thought of construing justice as a basic human need arose belatedly from professional concerns for the resolution of civil, criminal, and social conflict. As a result, justice in its pure form is thought to require restatement as the ultimate impetus for customs, laws, and regulations that govern human activity. It follows that laws and legal procedures can only approximate the ideal, and consequently they require regular examination against the major premise. The proposition is advanced for the consideration of administrators, community leaders, politicians, practitioners, the public at large, and scholars of different academic disciplines concerned with individual and community wellbeing¹..

Introduction

To those whose daily work brings them into contact with the suffering brought about either by adverse circumstances or the malevolence of others, it might seem self-evident for justice to be construed as a basic human need. Indeed as long ago as 1649 John Warr declared that ‘At the foundation of governments justice was in men before it came to be laws...Laws upon laws do bridle the people...The law can be reduced to its original state, which is the protection of the poor against the mighty’...(cited in Christopher Hill, 1972, pp. 272-273). Then more recently Sir Alfred Denning (1953, p.3) spoke of ‘the instinct of justice which leads us to believe that right, and not might, is the true basis of society...’

But the case needs to be advanced because justice is sometimes difficult to discern in the laws and their enactments. Systems that might have been introduced to serve a worthy purpose become self-serving and encrusted with irrelevance require revision of a kind that the NZ Law Commission (cf.2004), Parliament, and reformers sometimes proclaim². More than that, to the man in the street, criminal justice seems to assume more importance than civil, while more often social justice – the third and youngest member of the judicial family – has to be seen and not heard.

Already the adverse effects of economic deprivation – to give but one example of social injustice – are well documented with regard to the onset of law-breaking (Weiss 1998) and poor health and life expectancy (Howden-Chapman & Tobias, 2000; Marmot, 2005). Now the destructive effects of economic globalisation on community life are commanding attention (Korten in press). Recently the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG) (2004) declared

¹ The argument was presented first in an article (Taylor 2003a), and it has since been elaborated in a book with 16 contributors from various academic disciplines (Taylor, in press).

² In particular see contributions in the present volume from pioneers concerned with restorative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and human rights.

‘fairness (to be) a notion which is deeply felt and clearly recognized by people in every country’, and it said that a ‘fairer and more prosperous world is the key to a more secure world. Terror often exploits poverty, injustice and desperation to gain public legitimacy. The existence of such conditions is an obstacle in the fight against terrorism’ (WCSDG, 2004, p.8).

Subsequently the United Nations General Assembly (2005) endorsed the WCSDG theme, and it urged member countries to redress their priorities to avoid catastrophe.

Being thus encouraged, the argument is presented, moral development considered, terms defined, examples of disjunctions given, a theory of motivation selected in which the need might be integrated, and some of the implications are outlined..

The argument

The argument is that justice, whether criminal, civil, or social, is a human need that precedes any system designed to promote it. Judge McElrea (2004) intimated as much in his address to a legal conference in London in 2002, when, not unreasonably, he thought one ‘should be able to find, or create a theory about the innate sense of justice’. Sadly, he will be disappointed, because theories of personality and community development that are sometimes used to conceptualise public policy give justice scant attention (cf. Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1991). Instead the most accommodating of such theories merely allude to tangential aspects of justice that have a bearing on the acquisition and maintenance of moral behaviour and the pragmatic interpretation of laws and codes of conduct (cf. Ross & Miller, 2002).

But to social scientists, justice is a nebulous but far from negligible concept that underlies the operating system of individuals, families, tribes, communities, and nations both separately and collectively. Superficially, to quote the moral philosopher John Rawls (1971, p.302), justice rests on two principles – the first being that ‘everyone has as an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’, and the second that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality and opportunity’. He argued that people should divest themselves of vested interests and adopt an ‘original position’ for testing social contracts, in which the terms would be acceptable to everyone regardless of financial situation, race, religion, or health.

Specifically in academic psychology a number of researchers in the major behavioural, cognitive, and psychodynamic streams have studied the innate and the external factors relating to moral behaviour³. Among them Paul Jose (in press) combined aspects of Darwinian theory and Piagetian cognitive/developmental theory to explain the acquisition of rules for the survival of the species. He favoured the emerging synthesis of evolutionary ethics in which ‘the continual to and fro of

³ The first construing the infant as Locke’s *tabula rasa* onto which impressions were scored through the systematic application of rewards and punishment, the second relating the perception of rules to the progressive stages of intellectual development of children, and the third postulating the development of the super-ego or conscience through the initial introjection of values from parental figures.

assimilation and accommodation creating ever increasing sophistication and complexity is (*seen as*) a bio/social adaptive process occurring between the child and (*the*) environment', and he recognised the importance of self-interest as well as altruism in the formulation of moral beliefs, judgments, emotions, and appropriate behaviour. Up to a point, he thought that self-interest preserved individual contributions to the common heritage, and altruism created group interdependence against adversity.

In another well-reasoned chapter Hauser, Young, and Cushman (in press) went further to draw parallels between language development and morality. These researchers also regarded the development of morality as a biological phenomenon that depended on the complex interaction between innate structure, maturational factors, and environmental inputs. But interestingly they postulated the existence of a moral faculty within individuals that smacked of the early 19th century phrenologists Gall and Spurzheim, and they used explanatory terms reminiscent of those in the study of linguistics and of traumatic memory (van der Kolk, 1996) that were either expressive (i.e. accessible and declaratory) or operative (i.e. relatively inaccessible and non-declaratory). They accepted that 'the principles underlying adult competence are phenomenally complex, abstract, and inaccessible to conscious awareness', and they acknowledged that their work was still in its infancy. But it was their 'strong hunch' that once they had begun to uncover the principles underlying moral judgments the outcome would most certainly have an impact on behaviour. Accordingly they constructed a Moral Sense Test for obtaining empirical data about the underlying moral systems by which human beings operate⁴.

While the implications of the evolutionary bio/adaptive and the moral faculty postulates have yet to become clear, neither would seem to negate the proposition that justice should be regarded as a basic human need.

Definition of terms

Space precludes a didactic examination of the many and various definitions of justice, morality, and needs, but the following are typical of those on offer by the OED Online:

- 'justice' is taken to mean 'the exercise of authority or power in maintenance of right; vindication of right by assignment of reward or punishment':
- 'morality' refers to the 'personal qualities judged to be good' or bad: and
- 'needs' to 'be under a necessity to do something'.

Specifically the offering on justice confirms that the system has come to serve the laws and procedures rather than the underlying need. For this reason it is tempting to follow Rawls in substituting the term 'fairness' for justice, or the WCSDG in using the term 'fairplay', because either substitution would revive nostalgic memories of

⁴ The Moral Sense Test: Frequently asked questions that is attracting considerable attention – accessed April 28, 2005 from <http://wjh1.wjh.harvard.edu/~moral/test.html>

childhood when the notions of right and wrong are unsullied by bitter experience, specious argument, or vested interests. Certainly the philosophical psychologist Charles Tolman (in press) used the sporting analogy to good effect when using the rules of yacht racing to illustrate the need for justice. But regrettably for sailors the desire to win at all costs and for spectators to overcome the disappointment of supporting losers sometimes corrupt the ideals of sportsmanship. Then to change the metaphor for landlubbers, the much-quoted playing field is rarely level for all competitors, and there is no mandatory changing of ends at halftime to benefit the previously disadvantaged. Another reason to avoid the sporting analogy, to cite Judge McElrea (2004) again, is that too often criminal justice is portrayed as a game, 'with the lawyers playing the system (the rules) while the court acts as umpire, (*and*) justice... the loser'. Consequently it seemed advisable to try to restore the original conception of justice rather than to substitute the term 'fairness'.

Towards that end,

- Justice might be regarded as an essential precondition for approximating the good life: in other words it is the reciprocal quality of relationships that obtain between people for their mutual wellbeing.
- Morality might be retained as the quintessential code by which behaviour might be ordered: the distinction between morality and law depending more that between idealism and pragmatism as Denning (1953, chs. 1 & 5) so succinctly set out.
- Finally, basic human needs might be seen as the major motivators for personal and social development – the mainsprings of action that curiously are energised by depletion and tranquillised by repletion.

Then, having described the components of the thesis, the next stage is that of specifying the criteria by which empirical data might be obtained to determine the good life, moral behaviour, and fundamental needs. Here I can only offer a few leads while appealing to applied psychologists and psychometrists to lend their expertise. For example, it might be appropriate for researchers to begin with indicators to which individuals respond at official census times, because communities, like individuals, have their internal and external needs. Internally they depend on maintaining a population of sufficient size to ensure an adequate supply of food and water, housing, education, employment, energy, health and welfare service, and security. Externally they depend on trading partners for prosperity and defence commitments to preserve good order.

In considering the criteria I hark back to Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton (1949/50) who defined a society (i.e. a community) as a group of human beings 'sharing a self-sufficient system of action which is capable of living longer than the life-span of an individual, the group being recruited at least in part by the sexual reproduction of the members'. They made clear that to be viable a society has to adapt to, manipulate, and alter its situation to deal with threats, natural hazards, and technological changes. To do this a society requires 'activities to be broken down and assigned to capable individuals trained and motivated to carry them out', plus a common language and medium of communication, a shared cognitive orientation to make stable, meaningful, and predictable the social situations in which they are engaged, a shared and articulated set of goals, the normative regulation of means, the

regulation of affective expression, and the socialisation of new members. They went on to say that a society would be terminated by the biological extinction or dispersal of its members, by apathy, the war of all against all, and by absorption into another society.

Subsequently policy analysts construed a number of such components essential for a sustainable community as social indicators – i.e. reliable measures that collectively provide a contemporary view of social conditions and enable trends in a range of areas of social concern to be monitored⁵. Such indicators, selected for their relevance to the outcome of interest, being based on broad support, being grounded in research, allowing disaggregation, having consistency over time, being statistically sound, having immediacy, and allowing for international comparisons, were introduced in New Zealand by the Department of Statistics (Shields, 1979) and used by the Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988) when gaining empirical evidence from individuals of their prevalent priorities.

Disjunctions giving rise to the proposition

However, in the inimitable words of Robbie Burns ‘the best laid schemes o’ mice and men gang aft a-gley’. For me the realisation took years to dawn. First as a Probation Officer and then as a prison psychologist I came across such dissonance as:

1. two prisoners, one of whom had committed offences for which the other was imprisoned‘
2. a man who pleaded guilty to rape but was visited by the ‘victim and her family during remand, became engaged to her after he was sentenced, and married her on his release
3. an escapee whose legitimate defence had been ignored by his lawyer – although the Courts reconsidered the case and set the man free, the barrister could not be held accountable
4. adolescent ‘ship girls’ sentenced to Borstal Training for being ‘idle and disorderly and of no fixed abode’ while their seamen hosts committed no offence for taking them on board ships
5. the arbitrary if not capricious laws that until 1961 led to the prosecution of those who attempted suicide, and also that until 1985 led to the prosecution of adult males for their consenting sexual behaviour in private.

Then in matters of civil justice there was a man who displayed bizarre behaviour after falling from a ladder on night shift. He was taken to hospital where a neurosurgeon burred holes in his skull to release the blood that was thought to have accumulated there. He duly sued his employer for negligence, but in the preliminaries he was found to be a malingerer who was seeking enough cash as a deposit for a smallholding. Despite the exposure of his fraudulence, the insurance firm settled

⁵ Since 2001 the Ministry of Social Development (formerly of Social Policy) has collected and processed data regularly relating to the indicators for health, knowledge and skills, safety and security, paid work, civil, political and human rights, culture and identity, economic standards of living, social connectedness, and the quality of the environment (cf. Ministry of Social Development, 2004).

because it thought it might have lost more from adverse publicity than from paying the claim.

Finally the question of social justice came to the forefront of my mind, not so much from having been on the fringe of student revolutions in Europe and the United States in 1968/9 and in China in 1989 (Taylor 1970; 1994), nor from visiting Hiroshima in 1984 and discovering that the atomic bomb had been dropped **after** the Japanese had made entreaties for surrender, nor from the many examples of the discrimination against women, the maltreatment of children in their own homes or orphanages, nor even the actions of successive New Zealand governments in ignoring their obligations to Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi (cf. King, 2003), as from hearing the families of hostages searching desperately for an explanation to justify the action of the insurgents holding their loved ones in captivity in May 2000 in Fiji (Taylor, Nailatikau, & Walkey 2002). For me the issue was not the inalienable rights of mankind as reflected in the written or unwritten codes that came to be epitomised in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, but of justice as a basic universal need for human development and security.

At this point I turned to the major theories of individual and community development in search of one that might be of relevance.

Theories of human motivation

Here I found justice to feature in the index of very few introductory textbooks of general psychology. But by inference it was implicated in theories of personality that paid attention to individual super-ego development, classical conditioning, operant conditioning, moral development, and the creation of group norms (cf. Lundin, 1996). More specifically, in clinical psychology it was subsumed under the rubric of 'value-conflict stress' in relation to individuals who had become so alienated from their communities as to develop mental illness (Marsella, 1979). Then, in a rare statement affirming the contribution of environmental forces in the matrix of stress factors often found behind such a condition, Summerfield (2000) went so far as to say that

'history shows ... social reform is the best medicine, for victims of war and atrocity, this means public recognition and **justice**. (*He goes on to assert that* post-traumatic reactions are not just a private problem, with the onus on the individual to recover, but an indictment of the sociopolitical forces that produced them.' (my emphasis in bold face).

Yet from the emergence of community psychology in the 1980's, justice had been construed as a prominent motivating force in human behaviour with the primary emphasis on changing adverse environmental factors (Lorion, 1992). At the time many governments were committed to policies of social change, and, because of the amalgam of violence, inequality, abuse of human rights, and ecological problems perceived by postmodern global society, leading psychologists appealed to their colleagues to follow the idealistic Princeton World Order Project and commit themselves ideologically to a Quest for the Just Community (Newborough, 1992a; 1992b). But in the next decade, as Gregory (2001) reported, 'the lofty spirit, awakening of morals, and arousal of conscience... dimmed ... (*and*) wealth and

power (*replaced*) principles about what is right, or the pursuit of justice for all, or simply the greater good’.

Turning to the interpersonal domain of social psychology, Melvin Lerner (1980) introduced the concept of a 'just world' that was more realist and pragmatic than idealistic and teleological. He restricted the concept to a description of the initial tendency for individuals to maintain the status quo after any adverse incident by blaming the victim, unless the magnitude of the distress was substantially disproportional to the action that might have caused it. More recently he affirmed the importance of justice by saying that:

‘At the macro-level of analysis, at least in Western societies, justice has a special status superseding all other norms and values. The requirements of justice have the power to legitimize and, at times, to demand the sacrifice of liberty, lives, and happiness. No other secular norm has comparable power’.
(Lerner 2002).

But in saying that, Lerner must still have had criminal justice exclusively in mind, because in a democratic society the demand to ‘sacrifice .. liberty, lives, and happiness’ to sustain uncivil action or the unequal distribution of wealth can hardly be a requirement of justice –viz. the case of the Tolpuddle Martyrs in particular and of slavery in general.

However, in a series of textbooks on business management Porter, Bigley, and Steers, (2003, ch.2) took advantage of developments in social theory to refer to justice as it reflected a) the fair distribution of rewards and penalties in employment settings, b) the fairness of the processes through which the distributions were made, and c) the fairness of the interpersonal consequences. But they made no mention of the adverse psychological effects on general staff of the plundering of resources management at home and corporate dictatorship abroad for personal gain – i.e. corporate malfeasance on a gigantic scale, or the ‘unjust enrichment resulting from an abuse of fiduciary responsibility’, the effects of which can be regarded as tantamount to those of any other kind of disaster (Taylor, 2003b).

Finally, mention must be made of Reversal Theory (Apter, 2005), if only because it seems inapplicable for present purposes. The theory construes human behaviour primarily as the outcome of four pairs of contrasting needs – viz. either for achievement or gratification, conformity or negativity, giving or taking, self-centrism or altruism. Personality is said to consist of the constant reversal of reactions along each of the four dimensions, rather than of a somewhat consistent pattern derived from the recurrent expression of a few. But commendable as may be the emphasis on the capacity of every individual to display an ever-changing sequence of behaviour to gratify their immediate needs⁶, it is difficult to see how communities would function without individuals making some adaptation to each other and to the wider community.

⁶ Perhaps thereby endorsing Edward Hoch’s observation (1849-1925) that ‘there is so much good in the worst of us, and so much bad in the best of us, that it hardly becomes any of us to talk about the rest of us’.

Of all the major motivational researchers and theorists, Abraham Maslow (1908-1970)⁷ was the only one who came close to nominating **justice** *per se* as a human need when:

- he mentioned a number of its attributes such as ‘the child’s need for some kind of undisrupted routine or rhythm...a predictable, orderly world’ (*adding that*) **‘injustice**, unfairness, or inconsistency in the parents seems to make a child feel anxious and unsafe’ (Maslow 1954, p.86)
- he warned of the consequences of **injustice**, the evidence of which would be seen in the ‘neurotic or near-neurotic individuals’ who had been endangered as well as ‘the economic and social underdogs’ (Maslow 1954, p. 87). He observed that clinically such people behave ‘as if a great catastrophe were almost always impending, i.e. (they are) usually always responding as if to an emergency. (Their) safety needs often find specific expression in a search for a protector, or a stronger person on whom (they) may depend, perhaps a Fuhrer (Maslow 1954, p.88)’⁸, and
- he went on specifically to describe conditions such as ‘freedom to do what one wishes, so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to express oneself...to defend oneself, **justice**, fairness, and orderliness in the group (as) preconditions for basic need satisfactions, (saying) ‘These conditions are not ends in themselves but they are *almost* (sic) so since they are so closely related to the basic needs, which are apparently the only ends in themselves’ (Maslow 1954, p. 92)
– (again, my emphasis added in bold-face type).

But having said that, Maslow fell short of expecting the most psychologically mature people – whom he called the ‘self-actualized’ – to have moral obligations for helping the rest of mankind to address the injustice they might be suffering. He also spawned many ‘personal growth’ disciples, but very few critical researchers. Regrettably the psychologists in mainstream who might have filled the job were too devoted to logical positivism with its exclusive focus on objectivity in the advance of science to be attracted to the study of human values (cf. Israel & Goldstein, 1944). As Krutch (1956, pp. 122-123) wrote around that time:

‘What the mechanist disparagingly calls ‘the subjective’ is not that which we are least, but rather that of which we are most certain...Undoubtedly there are good reasons for distinguishing ‘the objective ‘ from ‘subjective’

⁷ All three editions of Maslow’s *Theory of human motivation* were consulted for the present chapter, but for editorial convenience the precise page references to justice relate to his first edition.

⁸ But in setting out his theory Maslow made scant reference to the devastating effects of such external social forces on human behaviour – although he did happen to mention in an appendix that ‘it would have been a blessing, not a curse, if Hitler or Mussolini had broken down with obvious schizophrenia’ (1954, p.371).

phenomena when our purpose is to study the first. But there is no justification for calling only the one real'⁹.

A revision of Maslow's theory

Despite the shortcomings of the theoretical constructs and of their empirical validation that Maslow himself acknowledged, it seemed sensible to revise his conceptualisation by:

1. including justice – all three civil, criminal, and social components combined – in the group of safety needs that Maslow identified
2. redesigning the familiar illustration to show the physiological needs, the safety needs, and the belonging needs as three legs of a milking stool, the precarious structure of which makes clear the fundamental importance of all three components (Figure 1), and
3. showing that further functional development of self-esteem and self-actualisation depend on all three legs being strong enough to carry the load,
4. while also placing an obligation on the more fortunate and secure to help those under strain

(Insert figure 1 about here)

The implications

Justice is more than a matter of a) affirming contractual rights, b) giving protection from criminality, c) neutralising the aversive effects of socio-political policies, d) making the courts and procedures less forbidding, and e) involving a cadre of responsible citizens in the process of mediation and reconciliation. Necessary as they are, those procedures serve the deeper purpose of satisfying a basic human need that individuals and communities have for security.

The challenge now is for researchers to develop procedures for accessing the underlying perception of justice within individuals and communities at different stages of the life cycle of awareness and responsibilities.

⁹ History shows that the epistemological tension between the psychological schools gave rise to the humanistic movement (Bugenthal, 1967), and eventually to a lone voice for values to be incorporated as a third component of the scientist-practitioner model for clinicians to adopt without tarnishing their reputations (O'Donohue, 1989). It remains for others to join the chorus.

References

- Aberle, D.F., Cohen, A.K., Davis, A.K., Levy Jr., M.J., & Sutton, F.X. (1949/50). The functional prerequisites of a society. *Journal of Ethics*, LX, 100-109.
- Apter, M. (2003) On a certain blindness in modern psychology. *The Psychologist*, 16, 9, 474-475.
- Apter, M. (2005). Reversal Theory Society: Dancers..not statues. – accessed May 7, 2005 from http://www.reversaltheory.org/RT_TheoryIntro.htm
- Bugenthal, J. (Ed.). (1967). *Challenges of humanistic psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Denning, Sir A. (1953). *The changing law*. London: Stevens & Sons.
- Gregory, R.J. (2001). The spirit and substance of community psychology: Reflections. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 29, 4, 473- 485.
- Hauser, M., Young, L., & Cushman, F. (in press). Reviving Rawls' linguistic analogy: Operative principles and the causal structure of moral action. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong. (Ed.). *Moral psychology and biology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hill, C. (1972). *The world turned upside down: Radical ideas during the English revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Howden-Chapman, P., & Tobias, M. (2000). *Social inequalities in health: New Zealand 1999*. Wellington: Ministry of Health.
- Israel, H., & Goldstein, B. (1944). Operationism in psychology. *Psychological Review*, 5, 1, 177-188.
- Jose, P. (in press). From Darwin to Piaget: the development and acquisition of moral beliefs. In A.J.W. Taylor (Ed.). *Justice as a basic human need*. (ch.4). Hauppauge NY: Nova Science.
- King, M. (2003). *The Penguin history of New Zealand*. Auckland: Penguin.
- Korten, D. (in press). Economic justice and injustice. In A.J.W. Taylor (Ed.). *Justice as a basic human need*. (ch.10). Hauppauge NY: Nova Science
- Kruch, J.W. (1956). *The measure of man: On freedom, human values, survival and the modern temper*. London: Alwin Redman.
- Kurtines, W.N. & Gewirtz, J.L. (Eds.). (1991). *Handbook of moral behaviour*. (3 vols.). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Law Commission. (2004). *Delivering justice for all: A vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals*. Wellington: Authors.

- Lerner, M.J. (1980). *The belief in a just world. A fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum.
- Lorion, R. P. (1992) Community psychology in the 1990's: Reflections from the editor. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 20, 3-6.
- Lundin, R.W. (1996). *Theories and systems of psychology*. (5th edn.). Lexington MA: Heath & Co.
- Marmot, M. (2005). Social determinants of health inequalities. *The Lancet*, 365, 1099-1104.
- Marsella, A.J. (1979). Cross-cultural studies of mental illness. In A.J. Marsella, R.G. Tharp, & T.J. Ciborowski. (Eds.). *Perspectives on cross-cultural psychology* (ch. 11). New York: Academic Press.
- Maslow, A.H. (1954/1970). *Motivation and personality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- McElrea, F.W.M. (2002). Restorative Justice-a New Zealand perspective. Conference paper for Modernising Criminal Justice – New World Challenges, London June 2002: accessed April 4, 2004 from http://www.napier.govt.nz/library/mcelrea/restoraive_justice_nz_perspective.htm
- Ministry of Social Development. (2004). *The Social Report*. Wellington, NZ.
- Newborough, J.R. (1992a). Community psychology for the 1990's. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 20, 7-9.
- Newborough, J.R. (1992b). Community psychology in the postmodern world. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 20,10-25.
- O'Donohue, W. (1989). The (even) Bolder Model. *American Psychologist*, 44, 12, 1460-1468.
- Porter, L.W., Bigley, G.A., & Steers, R.M. (Eds.), (2003). *Motivation and work behaviour*. 7th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Royal Commission on Social Policy. (1988). *Towards a fair and just society*. Wellington: Government Printer. pp 60.
- Shields, M. (1979). Social indicator development in New Zealand. In G. Cant, D. Hill, & M. Watson. (Eds.). *Social indicators for development planning in New Zealand* (pp. 15-35). Wellington: NZ National Commission for UNESCO/NZ Social Development Council.
- Taylor, A.J.W. (1970). Counselling and student unrest in universities abroad. *New Zealand Journal of Social Work*, 6, 3, 47-55.

Taylor, A.J.W. (1994). The 1989 student protest in Beijing. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies & Disasters*, 12, 3, 357-367.

Taylor, A. J.W. (2003a). Justice as a basic human need. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 21, 3, 209-219.

Taylor, A.J.W. (2003b). Bringing 'complex terrorism' and 'corporate malfeasance' into a classification schema for disasters. *Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, 18, 1, 27-34.

Taylor, A.J.W. (Ed.). (in press). *Justice as a basic human need*. New York: Nova Science Publishing.

Taylor, A.J.W., Nailatikau, S., & Walkey, F.H. (2002). A hostage trauma assignment in Fiji. *Australasian Journal of Disaster & Trauma Studies*, <http://www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/2002-2/taylor.htm>

Tolman, C. W. (in press). Agency and the need for justice. In A.J.W. Taylor (Ed.). *Justice as a basic human need*. (ch.2). Hauppauge NY: Nova Science.

United Nations (2005). *In larger freedom: Towards development, security, and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General*. A/59/2005. New York.pp.62.

van der Kolk, B.A. (1996). The body keeps the score: Approaches to the psychobiology of post-traumatic stress disorder. In van der Kolk, B.A., McFarlane, A.C., & Weisaeth, L. (eds.). *Traumatic stress: The effects of overwhelming experience on mind, body, and society*. (ch.10). New York: The Guilford Press

Weiss, R. P. (1998). Conclusion: Imprisonment at the Millenium 2000- its variety, and patterns throughout the world. In R. P. Weiss & N. South. (Eds.). *Comparing prison systems: Towards a comparative and international penology*. (ch.14). Australia: Gordon & Breach.

World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. (2004). *A fair globalization: Creating opportunities for all*. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Figure 1. Maslow's schema refigured to include justice as a basic human need.

